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TOPOLOGICAL ASPECTS
OF COMBINATORIAL POSSIBILITY
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to show that topology has a bearing on
combinatorial theories of possibility. The approach developed in this article is
“mapping account” considering combinatorial worlds as mappings from indi-
viduals to properties. Topological structures are used to define constraints on
the mappings thereby characterizing the “really possible” combinations. The
mapping approach avoids the well-known incompatibility problems. More-
over, it is compatible with atomistic as well as with non-atomistic ontologies.
It helps to elucidate the positions of logical atomism and monism with the
aid of topological separation axioms.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to show that topology has a bearing on combi-
natorial theories of possibility. The basic idea of combinatorial theories of
possibility is to conceptualize possible worlds as alternative combinations
of entities populating the actual world. According to the approach of unre-
stricted combinatorialism the idea of possibility is to be be traced back to all
combinations (cf. Armstrong (1989:37) whereas restricted combinatorialism
considers it as the basic problem of a combinatorial approach to distinguish
in a noncircular way between two sorts of combinations — the possible ones
and the impossible ones (cf. Bigelow 1988).
The topological approach to be developed in this paper is a restricted
combinatorialism, i.e., I consider it an essential task of a combinatorial the-
ory to draw a line between possible and impossible combinations. More
precisely, I am going to cast the combinatorial theory in the framework of a
“mapping account” that considers combinatorial worlds as mappings from
individuals to properties (cf. Skyrms 1993). The topological structures1 de-
fined on the sets of individuals and properties can then be used to define
non-modal constraints on the mappings thereby characterizing the “really
possible” combinations. In particular I want to show the following:
1. The mapping approach avoids the well-known incompatiblity problems
(cf. Bigelow 1988) unrestricted combinatorial accounts are notoriously
plagued with.2
1 Topological structures are not the only ones that might be used for this purpose. In
(Mormann 1992) lattice structures have been used for similar purposes. As will turn out
from the following considerations, quite a variety of mathematical structures may have a
bearing on combinatorial theories of possibility. Hence, the topological combinatorialism
advocated in this paper can be considered as a special case of a more general structural
combinatorialism.
The contention that structure has a bearing on modality is, of course, not new: it may
be traced back to Wittgenstein. In Tractatus (6.3751) he pointed out that there cannot
be worlds containing particles with different velocities at the same time because this is
excluded by the very structure of the physical state space which is used to define physically
possible worlds. However, in the modern accounts of combinatorial possibility, the concept
of structure has not played the crucial role it deserves, or so I want to argue.
2 At least at first view, unrestricted combinatorialism has to allow combinatorial worlds
as possible in which an individual i is both red and green (all over). This is absurd (cf.
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2. Topological constraints on combinatorial worlds offer structural criteria
of distinguishing between possible and impossible combinations.
3. Topological combinatorialism is compatible with atomistic as well as
with non-atomistic ontologies.
The outline of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we recall the basics
of the combinatorial account of possibility and cast it in the framework of
a mapping account which enables us to consider combinatorial worlds as
mappings. In section 3 we use topological concepts for the introduction of
complex individuals and properties. The resulting complex states of affairs
are dealt with in section 4. They lead to topologically motivated distinc-
tions between possible and impossible combinations. We propose two differ-
ent kinds of combinatorial worlds that may be dubbed the geometric and
the algebraic worlds. The former are committed to an atomistic ontology,
the latter not. Nevertheless they turn out to be essentially equivalent. In
section 5 we elucidate the positions of logical atomism and monism with
the aid of topological separation axioms. We conclude with some remarks
on how the general format of a structural combinatorialism may look like in
section 6. The aim of this paper is not so much to argue that one particular
version of topological combinatorialism scores best. Rather I want to show
that topological concepts may help solve some problems of the combinato-
rial theory of possibility. More generally, topology might be useful for the
elucidation of metaphysical concepts such as logical atomism and monism.3
2. Combinatorial possibility and world mappings
Let us start with a version of combinatorialism put forward by Armstrong
(1989) and others (cf. Armstrong 1989, Bigelow 1988). The basic building
blocks of the combinatorial worlds are (atomic) individuals and (atomic)
Bigelow (1988:43). In order to avoid these kinds of incompatibility problems, a friend of
the unrestricted combinatorial account has to show that incompatible properties such as
red and green are not basic properties. This might be difficult. Moreover, if this strategy
is successful, a serious shortage of properties might arise.
3 A succinct introduction to topology can be found in Davey/Priestley (1990). A fuller
account is given in Vickers (1989), Grosholz (1985) discusses the interrelations between
logic and topology, in particular the Stone Representation Theorem, from a philosophical
point of view. Her paper also contains a useful glossary of topological and lattice theo-
retical terms. Actually, the topological considerations employed in this paper are quite
elementary. We need not much more than the concepts of open and closed sets, and the
the concept of continuity.
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properties. The set of individuals is denoted by I and the set of properties
by Q. A state of affairs 〈ı, p〉 is an ordered pair of an individual ı and a
property p to be interpreted as the individual ı’s having property p or the
property p’s being instantiated by ı. The elements 〈ı, p〉 ∈ J are called the
states of affairs of the world J. A combinatorial world is defined as a totality
of states of affairs, i.e. as a relation J ⊆ I ×Q.
Without loss of generality we may assume that the elements of Q are
incompatible to each other, i.e. in a combinatorial world J each individual
has only one property. This is seen as follows: Let P denote the power set of
Q. A combinatorial world J ⊆ I ×Q is equivalent4 to a mapping
(∗) fJ : I → P
where fJ(ı) := {p | 〈ı, p〉 ∈ J}. In other words, fJ is a relation fJ ⊆ I × P.
Thus, a combinatorial world can be conceived of as a mapping from the set I
of individuals to the set P of incompatible properties.5 The combinatorial ac-
count based on (∗) will be called a mapping account of possibility. To have a
not too far-fetched example of (∗) take I to be a set of space-time points and
P a high-dimensional state space whose dimensions comprise mass, charge,
spin and the like. What is going on at a space-time point ı is completely
characterized by the value fJ(ı). In the world fJ each individual occupies ex-
actly one position in the state space P (cf. Skyrms 1993)). Another example
is the following: Suppose P is some colour space, e.g. the colour circle (cf.
Ga¨rdenfors (1991)), and I a set of individuals, each of them having exactly
one colour. Then a possible world f: I → P is a colour distribution6. These
examples show that the codomain P of a possible world mapping f: I → P
need not be a power set. It may be a manifold or a vectorspace. The essential
point is that P is a set of incompatible properties. This enables the mapping
account even to cope with the second problem of combinatorialism, to wit,
to distinguish between possible and impossible combinations. To see this
just start over again with the original definition of a combinatorial world as
a relation J ⊆ I × P retaining the assumption that P is a set of incompat-
ible properties. Then we may distinguish between possible and impossible
combinations as follows:
4 That is to say, J can be reconstructed from fJ and vice versa.
5 The incompatibility of the elements of P amounts to the trivial fact that in a world
J an individual ı has the properties it has and no others.
6 A detailed discussion of the topological and geometric structure of colour spaces can
be found in Ga¨rdenfors (1990) and Mormann (1993), concerning the problem of red/green
incompatibility, see especially p. 86.
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Definition 1. Let I be a set of individuals, P be a set of incompatible
properties. A relation J ⊆ I × P is a possible combination iff it is a function
from I to P.7 If J does not satisfy these requirements it is called an impossible
combination.8 The logical space of all possible worlds is the set Hom(I,P)9
of all functions with domain I and range P.
Let us pause for a moment and take stock what we have achieved so far.
The distinction between possible and impossible combinations is achieved by
imposing structural constraints on the combinatorial relation J and the set
P of properties. Similarly, the circumvention of incompatibility problems de-
pends on the structural constraints imposed on P. For these achievements we
have to pay a price, or so it seems: we have to rely on structural constraints
imposed on the world mappings. Thus, structural constraints serve as a sur-
rogate for modality. Taking into account structure should not, however, be
seen as a vice but as a virtue. It enables us to flesh out the somewhat ane-
mic set-theoretical combinatorialism according to which the world is just a
heap of atomic states of affairs. Combinatorial worlds based on state spaces
show that this is an oversimplification it is structure what really matters.
I contend that structural considerations must play a crucial role in any vi-
able combinatorial theories of possibility. The assertion that the ensembles
of individuals and properties are structures spaces rather than unstructured
sets is not a philosophers’ idle invention. Science itself teaches us that the
sets of individuals and properties are carry a lot of complex structures. For
instance, if we chose space-time points as the world’s atomic individuals we
take them as elements of a highly structured space-time manifold. Thus, it
is a legitimate aim of a philosophical theory of possibility to elucidate the
essentials of those structural “scientific” accounts of possibility. The main
thesis of this paper is that topological structures play an essential role in
this endeavour.
7 A relation J ⊆ I ×P is a function with domain I and codomain P iff it satisfies to the
following two structural constraints: (i) ∀ı ∈ I ∃p ∈ P 〈ı, p〉 ∈ J,
(ii) ∀ı ∈ I ∀p, p′ ∈ P (〈ı, p〉 ∈ J & 〈ı, p′〉 ∈ J ⇒ p = p′).
8 An impossible world J in the sense of Definition 1 contains states of affairs 〈ı, p〉 and
〈ı, p′〉 where p and p′ are incompatible to each other, and/or it has individuals that have
no properties at all. Each of these options qualifies J as an impossible world.
9 This denotation is borrowed from category theory (cf. Mac Lane/Moerdijk 1992).
Generally ‘Hom(I,P)’ is to be read as “the class of homomorphism from I to P”. In the
case of Definition 1 the homomorphisms are just the set theoretical functions from I to P.
The usefulness of this notation will turn out in the following.
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3. Complex individuals and topological structures
Even if there are atomic individuals and properties, and even if we had
suceeded to find out what they are, in most considerations we would still
like to talk about complex individuals and properties. Complex individuals
and properties are built up from atomic ones. Obviously, structures defined
on the set of atomic individuals and properties should play some role in
the constitution of complex individuals and properties. More precisely, they
should restrict the realm of those complex entities. Not just any contrived set
of atomic individuals should count as a decent complex individual. There
are various options of how structure may play a role in the constitution
of complex individuals and properties. I don’t want deal with the problem
which is best. I just mention two of them, called the Heyting approach and
the Borel approach which seem to be typical. For this purpose let us recall
the following basic topological definitions:
Definition 2. A topological space 〈X,O(X)〉 is a set X together with a
collection O(X) of subsets of X such that O(X) contains the empty set ∅,
X itself, all finite intersections, and arbitrary unions of members of O(X).
O(X) is called the Heyting algebra of open subsets of the topological space
〈X,O(X)〉.10
A subset Y of X is called a closed subset if it is the complement of an
open subset of 〈X,O(X)〉.
Intuitively, if x ∈ U(x) ∈ O(X), the open set U(x) is to be understood
as a neighborhood of x which comprises the elements of X that are near or
similar to x in a sense specified by U . According to another interpretation
the open neighborhoods might be thought of as predicates of the points of X
(cf. Vickers 1989).
Prominent examples of topological spaces are metrical spaces:
Definition 3. Let X be a metric space, i.e. a set endowed with a real-valued
function d:X × X → R which satisfies the familiar metrical axioms. For
x ∈ X and ε > 0 the ball U(x, ε) := {y | d(x, y) < ε} is to be defined as an
open set. By arbitrary union and finite intersection the open balls generate
a topology O(X) called the metric topology on X.
Perhaps the most familiar metric spaces are the Euclidean plane and its
offsprings, e.g. the real line and the unit interval [0, 1]. Metrical spaces are,
10 If there is no danger of confusion 〈X,O(X)〉 is abbreviated by X.
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however, in no way, the only examples of topological spaces. The following
two topological structures exist on any set X and will play an important
role in the following sections:
Examples. Let X be any set and P(X) its power set. On X we have the
following two extreme topologies: (i) O(X) = P(X). This topology is called
the discrete topology. (ii) The indiscrete topology defined byO(X) = {∅,X}.
If X is endowed with the discrete topology the elements of X are com-
pletely isolated from each other, i.e. each x ∈ X has an open neighborhood,
to wit the singleton {x}, which contains no other elements except x. In-
tuitively, the discrete topology renders X an extremely unconnected and
scattered structure. According to the indiscrete topology, there is no open
neighborhood which separates different elements of X. Intuitively, the in-
discrete topology renders X an extremely connected structure in which no
element can be separated from any other element.
Topological spaces abound. I dare say that all sets to be met in nature
actually are topological spaces. That is to say, sets come into being only
when we forget about the topological structures of topological spaces. As a
first application of the topological structures one should mention that they
can be used to topologically single out “nice” sets in favour of “wild” ones
(cf. Ga¨rdenfors 1991, Mormann 1993). For example, open or closed sets are
more natural than those that are neither open nor closed. Indeed, starting
with the set O(X) of open sets a full hierarchy of topologically more and
more complicated sets can be defined (cf. Grosholz 1985). In the following
I propose to use the first two or three levels of this hierarchy for defining
complex individuals and properties:
Definition 4. Let 〈I,O(I)〉 be a topological space. The elements of I are
to be interpreted as the atomic individuals.
(i) According to the Heyting approach, the set O(I) is to be taken as
the set of complex individuals.
(ii) The algebra B(I) of Borel sets is generated by O(I) using the
Boolean operations of complement, countable union, and intersection. Ac-
cording to the Borel approach, B(I) is to be taken as the set of complex
individuals.
(iii) Analogously, O(P) and B(P) define sets of complex properties.
The usefulness of topological structures, however, is not exhausted by the
definition of the topological hierarchy. Rather, the raison d’eˆtre of topological
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structures is that they provide an explication of the intuitive concept of
continuity and related concepts. Among the many equivalent definitions of
continuity we choose the following:
Definition 5. Let X and Y be topological spaces and f :X → Y a mapping.
The power sets of X and Y are denoted by P(X) and P(Y ), respectively.
The map f induces a map f−1 : P(Y ) → P(X) defined by f−1(A) :=
{x | f(x) ∈ A}, A ∈ P(Y ). f is said to be continuous iff f−1 maps
open sets of Y onto open sets of X, i.e. iff f−1 can be restricted to a map
f−1:O(Y )→ O(X).
At this stage the general strategy of the topological mapping account
to a combinatorial theory of possibility should be clear: first the sets of
atomic individuals and properties are endowed with convenient topological
structures. What is to be countenanced as convenient largely is an empirical
question. The examples of physical state spaces and colour spaces give us
some hints. Then the topological structures are used to define structural
constraints which are imposed on “really possible” world mappings. This
may be done in various ways, the most straightforward one is to stipulate
possible worlds as continuous mappings.
As a first example how this may be done let us consider once again
the combinatorial worlds fJ: I → P as defined in (∗). Natural topological
structures on I and P may be defined by defining partial orders on I and P
as follows:
Definition 6. Let J ⊆ I ×Q be a combinatorial world.
(i) A partial order on I is defined by:
ı ≤ 
df
⇐⇒
∀k(∃p(〈ı, p〉 ∈ J & 〈k, p〉 ∈ J) ⇒ (∃p⋆(〈, p⋆〉 ∈ J & 〈k, p⋆〉 ∈ J)) .
(ii) A partial order on P = P(Q) is defined by set theoretical inclusion.
A topological structure O(I) on I is defined as follows:
K ∈ O(I)
df
⇐⇒ { | ∃ı ∈ K ı ≤ } = K .
(iii) A topological structure O(P) on P is defined by
L ∈ O(P)
df
⇐⇒ {f | ∃h ∈ L h ⊆ f} = L .
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As is well-known a map fJ: I → P is continuous with respect to the
topologies defined above if and only if it is order-preserving in the following
sense:
∀ı,  ∈ I(ı ≤  ⇒ f(ı) ⊆ f()) .
The intuitive meaning of those orders on I is the following: elements ı and k
for which a q with 〈ı, q〉 and (k, q) exist may be characterized as neighbors
in J. The relation ı ≤  holds iff all neighbors of ı are neighbors of  (the
reverse may not be the case).
The set fJ(ı) is to be considered as the set of properties the individual ı
has in the combinatorial world J. Hence, the world map fJ is order-preserving
iff an individual  that has more neighbors in J than an individual ı has at
least all the properties ı has. This seems to be a quite natural requirement.
However, as is easily seen not all relations J ⊆ I × Q do satisfy it. Thus,
continuity of the world map fJ happens to be an effective constraint to
distinguish between “really possible” worlds and others that do not enjoy
this property.
Of course, the topological approach of Definition 6 may be generalized:
we no longer stick to the special order topologies of Definition 6 but general-
ize to other convenient topological structures. In particular, we do no longer
assume that P has the structure of a power set, rather we are content to
stipulate that it is a topological space whose elements are to be interpreted
as mutually incompatible properties.
4. Topologically possible combinatorial worlds
Complex individuals and complex properties remain useless as long as we
do not explain how they combine to form complex states of affairs. The def-
inition of complex facts will enable us to identify the topological constraints
that distinguish between possible and impossible combinations. The general
result will be that only those worlds are regarded as possible whose com-
plex individuals behave decenctly, i.e. have complex properties. This is to
be spelt out as follows: Let f: I → P be a possible world in the sense of
(∗). In this world the atomic individual ı has the atomic property f(ı). It
is tempting to stipulate that in the world f the complex (Borel or Heyting)
individual K ⊆ I has the property f(K). However, if there is no constraint
on f the “property” f(K) might not be a Borel or Heyting property. As is
mathematically well-known, this is almost always the case: thus, according
to (∗), in most possible worlds most complex individuals would not have
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any properties at all. This does not sound plausible. In a world, an individ-
ual should have properties. Otherwise it would exist in that world but in
an indeterminate and unspecified way (cf. Armstrong 1989:43). One might
conclude that complex individuals and properties do not to fit the mapping
account of combinatorialism. The combinatorial approach seems to be in-
compatible with complex individuals, properties and states of affairs. This
conclusion, however, would be drawn too hastily. The situation is not hope-
less. The necessary revision of (∗) will show the real virtues of a topological
combinatorialism.
There are several strategies to avoid the shortcomings of the naive def-
inition (∗).11 I want to pursue two of them. They may be dubbed the ge-
ometric and the algebraic account. Both rely on the plot of restricting the
world mappings by suitable structural (geometric or algebraic) constraints.
The geometric account relies on structural constraints defined for atomic
individuals and properties, the algebraic not. Let us start with the following
geometric account:
Definition 7. (Geometric worlds) A possible world is a continuous function
f: I → P. An impossible world is a discontinuous function f: I → P. The
class of complex individuals is the algebra of Borel (resp. Heyting) sets of
I, the class of complex properties is the algebra A (P) of analytic sets12
of P. The states of affairs of f is the class {〈K, f(K)〉 | K ∈ B(I)} (resp.
{〈K, f(K)〉 | K ∈ O(I)}). The logical space of possible worlds is the set
HomC(I,P) of continuous mappings from I to P.
To spell out the role of the continuity constraint in some more detail the
intuition behind Definition 7 may be formulated as follows: Continuity en-
sures that in possible combinations complex individuals get decent complex
11 A rather adhoc manoeuvre to save (∗) I will not further pursue is the following: we
stipulate a possible world to be a function f: I → P which maps each Borel (resp. Heyting)
set K ⊆ I onto a Borel (resp. Heyting) set f(K) ⊆ P. Consequently, an impossible world
is a function f that happens to map a Borel (resp. Heyting) individual onto a non-Borel
(resp. non-Heyting) subset of P. This plot has the drawback that in the case of Borel sets
the class of functions which satisfy this criterion is mathematically not well understood.
At least, I haven’t been able to find any information about those function in the literature
relevant to the subject. Moreover, for Heyting worlds this definition would be obviously
inappropriate since it is too restrictive. For instance, a constant function mapping all
individuals to one property would not count as a possible world.
12 There are continuous functions f: I → P such that f(K) is not a Borel set even if
K ⊆ I is Borel (cf. Jech (1978:497f)). The image f(K) of a Borel set by a continuous
function always belongs the algebra A (P) of analytic sets, however.
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properties. Impossible worlds are characterized by the fact that they contain
complex individuals with contrived “non-properties”.
The concept of geometric combinaorial worlds depends on the the strong
empirical assumption that there are atomic individuals and properties which
constitute the complex individuals and properties. One might wish to get rid
of this strong presupposition. This can be achieved by switching from geo-
metric to algebraic worlds. According to the algebraic account combinatorial
worlds no longer have to be atomically constituted. Although the algebraic
account turns out to be essentially equivalent to the geometric it conceptu-
ally differs from the latter. It is based on the observation that a continuous
map f :X → Y induces a morphism between the Heyting (or Borel) alge-
bras of X and Y . That is to say, even if a continuous map f: I → P does not
necessarily map a Heyting or Borel individual K onto a Heyting or Borel
property f(K) the reverse set theoretical map f−1: 2P → 2I does. It even in-
duces a Borel homomorphism f−1:B(P)→ B(I). Hence, if we forget about
the set theoretical map f we may define a possible world as a morphism
of Borel algebras h : B(P) → B(I) (or as a morphism k:O(P) → O(I) of
Heyting algebras). This move requires some further adjustments concerning
the states of affairs of the possible world redefined in this manner. How they
should be defined? A straightforward answer is to be recommended: Given
h, the property L ∈ B(P) is instantiated by the (Borel or Heyting) individ-
ual h(L). Hence, a state of affairs of the world h should be a pair 〈L,h(L)〉.
Or, to state it in a different way, in h the individual h(L) has the property
L. However, this definition is not quite right. According to it, we lose a lot
of states of affairs we probably like to retain and get into conflict with the
principle that every individual in a possible world should have a property
therein. This is seen as follows: assume that 〈L,h(L)〉 is a state of affairs in
h. For a complex individual K ⊆ h(L) we cannot guarantee that there is a
L′ with h(L′) = K. Thus, the following definition suggests itself:
Definition 8. (Atomistic algebraic Borel worlds) Let I and P be the spaces
of individuals and properties, respectively. A possible world is a morphism
of Borel algebras h:B(P) → B(I). The class of states of affairs of h is the
class {〈L,K〉 | L ∈ B(P) & K ∈ B(I) & K ⊆ h(L)}. The logical space
of all possible worlds is the class of Borel morphisms HOMB(B(P),B(I))
from B(P) to B(I). An impossible world is given by a map h:B(P)→ B(I)
which fails to be a Borel morphism.13
13 Quite analogously, we may define possible worlds based on the Heyting algebras O(P)
and O(I). In this case the logical space is the set HomH (O(P),O(I)) of Heyting morphisms.
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As Skyrms (1993) has pointed out the definition of possible worlds as
a Borel or Heyting algebra morphisms paves the way for a genuinely non-
atomistic combinatorial theory of possibility: we forget about the underlying
topological spaces I and P defining the individuals and properties of such a
world as elements of the appropriate Borel or Heyting algebras:
Definition 9. (General algebraic Borel worlds) Let BI and BP be Borel
algebras to be interpreted as the classes of complex individuals and proper-
ties, respectively. A possible world is a Borel algebra morphism h:BP → BI .
The states of affairs of the world h are defined as in Definition 8. The logical
space of all possible worlds is the set HOM(BP,BI) of Borel morphisms
between BP and BI . An impossible world is a map k:BP → BI that is not
a Borel morphism.14
The main advantage of these algebraic concepts of combinatorial worlds
is that we we are no longer restricted to worlds constitutited by atomic
individuals and properties. As is well known, Borel and Heyting algebras
generally have no atoms.15 Thus, the general algebraic account of Heyting
or Borel worlds shows that the combinatorial approach need not subscribe
to atomism. This should be considered as a definitive advantage. That the
ultimate structure of the world is atomistic is to be considered as an em-
pirical claim a metaphysical theory such as the combinatorial account to
possibility should not depend on.
To sum up we may say that the topological mapping account offers
two types of combinatorial worlds: on the one hand we have the geometric
account which conceptualizes possible combinatorial worlds as continuous
mappings; on the other hand we have the algebraic account which conceptu-
alizes possible combinatorial worlds as morphisms of algebras. The geometric
combinatorial worlds are constituted by atomic states pf affairs constituted
by atomic individuals and properties. Generally, this does not hold for al-
gebraic worlds: Borel and Heyting worlds may be genuinely non-atomistic,
i.e. they may contain no atomic states of affairs at all.
How these two types of combinatorial worlds are related? The answer is
as smooth as can be. Using the Stone Representation theorem, Skyrms has
pointed out that the geometric and algebraic Borel worlds are essentially
14 An analogous definition might be given for worlds based on Heyting algebras of
complex individuals and properties.
15 A common example is provided by the Heyting algebra O([0, 1]) of the unit interval
[0, 1].
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equivalent. Stone’s theorem asserts (see Vickers (1989), Th. 9.5.4) that for
any Boolean algebra B there is a topological space St(B) such that B is
isomorphic to the field of all subsets of St(B) that are closed and open
with respect to the topology of St(B). Boolean homomorphisms from BP
to BI are in 1-1-correspondence with the continuous maps from St(BI) to
St(BP). Hence, if we are ready to inflate our ontology from the Borel algebras
of complex properties and individuals to their Stone spaces we arrive at
the geometric combinatorial worlds constituted by atomic individuals and
properties. Vice versa, a geometric world f: I → P gives rise to an algebraic
world f−1:B(P)→ B(I).
Similarly, under some mild assumptions, the algebraic approach for Heyt-
ing worlds can be shown to be equivalent to the gemetric approach16, i.e.,
a geometric Heyting world gives rise to an algebraic Heyting world and vice
versa. Thus, the non-atomistic algebraic versions of the combinatorial ap-
proach based on the algebras of Borel or Heyting sets can be cast into the
same framework of topological combinatorialism as the atomistic geometric
ones based on continuous mappings.
5. A topological elucidation of atomism and monism
The ideas of logical atomism may be traced back to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
and Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Both were opposed to the
monism of the British idealists of that time who held that reality is one
single thing, not many — even if our limited cognizing capacity forces us to
think of it as it were composed of many independent separate things (cf.
Bradley 1992:5).
Taking states of affairs as the ultimate constituents of the world, I con-
sider take atomism to be the doctrine that the states of affairs into which
the world divides are all independent of each other. Thus, atomism sub-
scribes to a principle of independence according to which an individual’s ı
having a property p is independent of an individual’s  having the property
q. The principle of independence is denied by monistic doctrines. According
to them, single states of affairs are only abstractions, and the independence
principle is radically wrongheaded. If one state of affairs is properly under-
stood it determines the whole world, i.e., all other states of affairs. These
16 A Heyting algebra H gives rise to a topological space T(H) in such a way that a
Heyting morphism h:H → H ′ induces a continuous map T(h): T(H ′) → T(H). Under
reasonable conditions, i.e. if H is spatial (cf. Mac Lane/Moerdijk (1992:478) the Heyting
algebra O(T(H)) of open sets of T(H) is just H again.
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vague claims may be elucidated with the help of topological separation ax-
ioms, or so I want to argue. Let us start within the naive mapping account
of (∗). In this framework the independence principle for atomic individuals
may be formulated as follows:
5.1. Atomic independence principle. Given any two different atomic
individuals ı and  and any two properties p and q there is a possible world
mapping f: I → P with f(ı) = p and f() = q.
Because no constraints are imposed on f we stipulate f(ı) = p and
f() = q and define it as we like on the rest of I. This, of course, is not
too exciting. A somewhat more interesting problem arises if we put the
topological structures of I and P to work. That means, we define a possible
world as a continuous function f: I → P. Is it still true that there is a world
f with f(ı) = p and f() = q? The general answer is no. We have to assume
that I is at least an Urysohn space.17 This is not a particularly strong re-
striction, all “reasonable” sets of individuals, e.g. spacetime manifolds, are
Urysohn spaces.
What about independence principles for disjoint complex individuals (cf.
Armstrong 1989:69/70)? A quite strong (and naive) independence principle
for complex individuals reads as follows:
5.2. General independence principle. Given any two disjoint individuals
ı and  and any two properties p and q there is a possible combinatorial world
f: I → P in which ı has property p and  has property q, i.e. f(ı) = p and
f() = q.
If we put no restrictions on the world mapping f, 5.2 is valid for trivial
reasons. More interesting is the case of continuous worlds. Topology offers a
well assorted box of different possibilities. I don’t want to discuss them all
in detail, and I mention just one:
5.3. Independence principle for closed individuals. Let ı and  be two
disjoint closed individuals and p and q two properties. There is a continuous
17 X is an Urysohn space iff for any two different points a, b ∈ X there is a continuous
function f :X → [0, 1] such that f(a) = 0 and f(b) = 1. The Urysohn condition is slightly
stronger than the more familiar Hausdorff separation axiom stating that any two different
points a and b can be separated by disjoint open sets O(a) and O(b) containing a and b
respectively (cf. Seebach/Steen 1978, section 2).
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world f: I → P with f(ı) = p and f() = q iff I is a normal topological
space.18
As is easily seen, an independence principle for non-closed disjoint in-
dividuals does not hold for continuous possible worlds: Take I to be the
unit interval [0, 1] endowed with the standard topology. Let K denote the
complex Borel individual of rational numbers. Then, in a continuous world
f: I → P the property f(K) of K completely determines the properties of all
other individuals. This case can easily be generalized to differentiable mani-
folds. Thus, if we take combinatorial worlds defined by physical state spaces
as a guideline an unrestricted principle of indenpendence for complex indi-
viduals cannot be maintained anymore. In other words, scientifically possible
combinatorial worlds are less atomistic and more monistic than an extreme
Russellian atomism might be prepared to accept. It should be noted that the
fact that a general independence principle for disjoint complex individuals
does not hold depends on the fact that we maintained a conservative stance
with respect to the topological structures defined on I and P. By brute force,
i.e. if we are prepared to drastically change the topological structure of I
or P we arrive at radically atomistic and monistic continuous combinatorial
worlds as is shown by the following examples:
5.4. Examples. (i) Let the set P of properties be endowed with the dis-
crete topology. Then a continuous possible world f: I → P is completely
determined by the property f(ı) of some individual ı.
(ii) Let the set P of properties be endowed with the indiscrete topology.
Then, for any disjoint individuals an unrestricted independence principle
holds with respect to worlds f: I → P.
Proof. (i) Chose any ı ∈ I. Since f is continuous, the set f−1(f(ı)) is open.
Since I is connected this amounta to the requirement that f is constant, i.e.
f() = f(ı) for all  ∈ I.
(ii) If P is endowed with the indiscrete topology, the condition of continu-
ity is empty, i.e. just any f is continuous. Thus, an unrestricted independence
principle holds. 2
18 A topological space X is called normal iff it satisfies the following two conditions (cf.
Steen/Seebach 1978:11):
(1) If a, b ∈ X there are open set O(a) and O(b) containing a and b respectively such that
b 6∈ O(a) and a 6∈ O(b);
(2) If A and B are disjoint closed sets in X, there are disjoint open sets O(A) and O(B)
containing A and B respectively. Normal spaces are well-known to satsify the Urysohn
condition.
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Hence, the world of 5.4(i) is a monist world in the sense of Bradley: If you
really understood any one state of affairs, i.e. if you were able to determine
its properties you would understand everything, i.e. you would understand
all states of affairs (cf. Russell (1918:204)), while the world 5.4(ii) is an
atomistic world in the strictest possible sense: even if you knew quite a
lot of many states of affairs you would still be completely ignorant about
the rest. In such an atomic world no kind of induction or prediction would
make any sense. As can be seen from this example, the stances of extreme
monism and atomism may be topologically characterized as the two ends of
a spectrum of more plausible intermediate positions. Thus, topology may be
a useful device for elucidating the sweeping and vague theses of those broad
metaphysical claims in more precise way.
6. Concluding remarks
In this final section I want to outline the general format of a structural com-
binatorialism as it is recommended by the topological accounts developed in
the previous sections. The general format of a combinatorial theory of pos-
sibility put forward in this paper can be displayed best borrowing a piece of
notation from category theory (Mac Lane/Moerdijk (1992:11f)). Let I and
P be two structures of an appropriate type (for example topological spaces
or Boolean algebras), to be interpreted as individuals and properties respec-
tively. The class of structure preserving morphisms from I to P is denoted by
HomC(I,P). Here C symbolizes the type (actually the category) of structure
preserving constraints put on the admissible morphisms f: I → P. Possible
worlds are structure preserving mappings.
The set HomC(I,P) is to be considered as the logical space of possible
worlds of the combinatorial account. If we forget about the structural con-
straints of C we get a larger class of morphism Hom(I,P) which still gives
rise to combinatorial worlds. Combinatorial worlds f: I → P belonging to
Hom(I,P) but not to HomC(I,P), are to be considered as impossible worlds.
Or, if one does not want to draw a sharp line between the possible and
the impossible, those worlds might be characterized as far-fetched or absurd
worlds.
Thus, the distinction between possible and impossible worlds essentially
depends on the structural constraints C. For the sake of definiteness, let
us concentrate on the case where C can be interpreted as the constraint of
continuity. The continuity of a world map f: I → P depends on the topo-
logical structures defined on I and P. These structures are to be conceived
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of as higher order states of affairs (cf. Armstrong (1989:87f)). A world is,
so to speak, a topologically structured totality of states of affairs, or, to
express somewhat more generally, it is a structural gestalt (cf. Mormann
1994). Hence, it is not completely described by a world function f: I → P.
Although f uniquely determines the totality of first-order states of affairs
the higher order states of affairs are missing. Thus, in a topologically re-
fined combinatorial approach there can be distinct worlds which share all
the same first order states of affairs but differ with respect to higher order
states of affairs.19 The introduction of higher-order states of affairs may rise
some suspicions among nominalistically-minded philosophers. But I think
the combinatorial approach is justified to do this step. It must even do
it. Science has gathered ample evidence that the actual world cannot be
described in the framework of a strict first-order nominalism. The combi-
natorial approach to possibility should accommodate to this fact admitting
topological and other higher order structural states of affairs.20
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